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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Conrad Petersen's
motion to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss Count I (money laundering) of
the multi-count information filed in this case. This supplemental brief is necessary to
address whether the State does not have the right to appeal the motion to dismiss one
count of the multi-count information under the Idaho Appellate Rules (hereinafter,

I.AR.).

The State asserted that it could appeal that order under the rule allowing

appeals from orders dismissing the information. However, in this case, the information
survived the order to dismiss one, but not all of the counts, as the district court
expressly denied Mr. Petersen's motion to dismiss Count II (attempted destruction of
evidence). Further hearings in regard to Count II are pending, but suspended during
the pendency of this appeal.

As such, the information has not been dismissed.

Therefore, that rule does not afford the State the right to appeal in this case.
Furthermore, none of the other rules allowing appeals provide a right to appeal a
partial dismissal of the information.

For example, for the same reasons that the

information has not been dismissed, the criminal action has not been terminated, and so
the rule allowing appeals from the termination of the criminal action is inapplicable.
Finally, this is not, as the Idaho Supreme Court has already held, a situation where this
Court should exercise its plenary authority to hear otherwise improper claims on appeal.
Therefore, this Court should dismiss the State's challenge to the dismissal of Count I
because the State does not have the right to appeal that decision.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Petersen's Respondent's Brief. With one exception, they need not be repeated in
this Supplemental Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
The State filed, contemporaneously with its reply brief, a motion to augment the
record with the notice of appeal. (Resp. Br., pp.2-3; Augmentation - Notice of Appeal.)
The notice of appeal asserts that the State has the right to appeal the order granting the
motion to suppress and the order granting the motion to dismiss Count I pursuant to

I.AR. 11(c)(3) and (7). 1 (Augmentation- Notice of Appeal, pp.1-2.)

I.AR. 11 (c)(7) permits the State to appeal an order granting the motion to suppress
evidence. As such, Mr. Petersen limits his argument to only the State's appeal from the
order granting his motion to dismiss Count I.
1
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ISSUE
Whether this Court should dismiss the State's appeal from the district court's order
granting Mr. Petersen's motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

3

ARGUMENT
This Court Should Dismiss The State's Appeal From The District Court's Order Granting
Mr. Petersen's Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Appellate Jurisdiction

A

Introduction
The notice of appeal serves to perfect the appeal and confer jurisdiction over the

claims on the appellate courts. See Floyd v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 137
Idaho 718, 723 (2002) (holding that an untimely notice of appeal was "inadequate to
confer jurisdiction" upon the appellate court); Shultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385
(Ct. App. 2011) (holding that "a time-barred notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction
on the appellate courts, and thus, there is no valid appeal for an appellate court" in
which the court could grant the relief sought).

One aspect necessary to confer

jurisdiction is a right to appeal, based on the grounds identified in I.AR. 11 (c).

See

State v. Young, 133 Idaho 177, 178 (1999) (noting that the right to appeal was
traditionally articulated in a statute, up until the Appellate Rules were adopted). When
the challenged order does not fall within the grounds identified in I.AR. 11 (c), "the
notice of appeal herein confers no appellate jurisdiction.
dismissed."

Accordingly, the appeal is

State v. Rollins, 103 Idaho 48, 49-50 (Ct. App. 1982). The question of

"[w]hether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any time."

State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004).
While the appellant's claim must usually fall under one of the enumerated rights
to appeal in I.AR. 11(c), see Young, 133 Idaho at 178, there is another mechanism by
which it might bring that claim: through an exercise of this Court's plenary power to
review decisions by the district court. The plain language of I.AR. 11 (c) does not afford
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the State the right to challenge the dismissal of one count in a multi-count information,
as it is trying to do in this case. See I.AR. 11 (c). Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme
Court has consistently rejected the State's request in nearly-identical cases, refusing to
exercise its plenary authority so as to allow the State to appeal when I.AR. 11(c) does
not afford the State the right to appeal. See, e.g., State v. Molinelli, 105 Idaho 833, 835
(1983).

Therefore, since neither mechanism permits the State to appeal in this

situation, its notice of appeal fails to confer appellate jurisdiction upon this Court
regarding the State's challenge to the order dismissing Count I. See, e.g., Rollins, 103
Idaho at 49-50. Therefore, this Court should dismiss that appeal.

8.

The Idaho Appellate Rules Do Not Provide The State A Right To Appeal The
Dismissal Of One Count Of A Multi-Count Information
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the "literal language" of the

Idaho Appellate Rules governs whether I.AR. 11 (c) permits an appeal.

See, e.g.,

Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835; State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 825 (1982). In Molinelli,
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the grounds for the notice of appeal were
authorized by the Appellate Rules.

Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 834. The Idaho Supreme

Court specifically discussed the scope of I.AR. 11 (c)(3), which is the rule the State tries
to rely on for the right to appeal in the present case. (Augmentation - Notice of Appeal).
In Molinelli, the State was claiming that it could appeal an order reducing the
charge from delivery down to possession of a controlled substance pursuant to
I.AR. 11 (c)(3). Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835. However, I.AR. 11 (c)(3) only affords the
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right to appeal '"[a]n order granting a motion to dismiss an information or complaint."' 2
Id. (quoting I.AR. 11 (c)(3)). As such, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he

district court's order clearly does not fall within the literal language of the Rule, and
applying the reasoning set forth in Dennard, supra, we decline to so construe the Rule
simply to give the State a right of appeal under these circumstances." Id. In Dennard,
the Idaho Supreme Court refused to "stretch the language of [the rule] beyond its plain
meaning," particularly when an alternative mechanism (the Court's plenary power) to
appeal existed. 3 Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825. Therefore, the Molinelli Court, looking at
the plain language of I.AR. 11(c)(3), determined that it did not apply to the reduction of
a charge, since doing so does not dismiss the Information. See Molinelli, 105 Idaho at

835.
Similarly, in this case, the plain language of I.AR. 11 (c) does not include a right
to appeal the dismissal of one count of a multi-count information, as the State claims in
the notice of appeal. That rule only allows appeals from "[a]n order granting a motion to
dismiss an information or complaint." I.AR. 11 (c)(3) (emphasis added); see Molinelli,

105 Idaho at 835.
generally R.)

In this case, the information survived the challenged order. (See

In fact, the district court expressly denied Mr. Petersen's motion to

dismiss Count II (destruction of evidence). (R., p.229.) The continued viability of that
charge does not hinge, at least directly, on this Court's resolution of the State's

At that time, there was no specific provision, as there is now, allowing an appeal from
"[a]ny order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the
objection of the prosecutor." I.AR. 11 (c)(5).
3 However, as will be discussed in depth infra, the Dennard Court subsequently
determined that an exercise of the Court's plenary power was not appropriate to allow
such an appeal. See Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26.
2
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challenges on appeal. 4 It is a separate charge born of a different, but related, set of
facts than the other charges. (See R., p.87.) Additionally, there is still a motion pending
before the district court in regard to that particular charge, which it will have to decide
regardless of this Court's decisions in this appeal. (See R., pp.231-65.) Therefore, the
information survived the order dismissing Count I.

As such, the literal language of

I.AR. 11 (c)(3) does not give the State the right to appeal that order, since it did not
"dismiss the information." See I.AR. 11(c)(3); Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835.
None of the other grounds to appeal identified in I.AR. 11 (c) allow for the State's
appeal in this regard either. For example, I.AR. 11 (c)(5), which addressed the effect of
the holding from Molinelli, only provides that an appeal may be brought from "[a]ny
order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the objection
of the prosecutor." I.AR. 11 (c)(5) (emphasis added). In this case, the charge in Count I
was not reduced.

Compare Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 834 (noting that the charge of

delivery a controlled substance was reduced to possession of a controlled substance).
Rather, Count I was dismissed in its entirety. (See R., p.225.) The critical difference is
that, following the district court's order, the defendant in Molinelli still faced punishment
for the alleged criminal conduct, whereas Mr. Petersen did not. Therefore, since the

Before the proceedings below were stayed pending this appeal, Mr. Petersen had
requested, and was granted the opportunity to provide additional briefing on how the
order to suppress might impact the charge in Count II. (R., pp.231-33.) Both parties
have filed briefing in that regard. (R., pp.235-42; 253-57.) The district court intended
to allow Mr. Petersen the chance to file a reply to the State's brief in this matter.
(R., p.262.) However, before that reply brief was filed, the proceedings below were
suspended pending the outcome of this appeal. (R., pp.264-65.) This procedural
history only further demonstrates that Count II will survive this appeal and will be
properly dealt with by the district court after this case is ultimately remanded.
Regardless, that issue is unrelated to the order dismissing Count I, which is the order
improperly appealed.
4
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challenged order did not "reduce the charge," this appeal does not fall under the literal
language of I.AR. 11 (c)(5), and therefore, it does not permit the State's appeal in that
regard. See Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835.
Nor does this appeal fall under I.AR. 11 (c)(4).

That subsection allows for

appeals from "[a]ny order or judgment, whenever entered and however denominated,

terminating a criminal action, provided that this provision shall not authorize a new trial
in any case where the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy would otherwise
prevent a second trial." I.AR. 11 (c)(4) (emphasis added). The legislature has defined
the term "criminal action":

"The proceedings by which a party charged with a public

offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment is known as a criminal action."
I.C. § 19-103. Since the proceedings, which are currently suspended, will continue in
regard to Count II, regardless of the outcome of this appeal (see, e.g., R., pp.231-65
(dealing with Mr. Petersen's request for supplemental argument regarding the scope of
the order suppressing the evidence and its impact on Count II, which, at this point,
survives)), the criminal action has not been terminated. Compare State v. Huntsman,
146 Idaho 580, 584 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a criminal action is terminated when a
defendant is no longer facing charges, and is thus, no longer in "jeopardy," and so, must
be freed from incarceration). In this case, Mr. Petersen is still facing at least one charge
from the original information.
same course of proceedings.

Compare id. As such, he is still in jeopardy under the
Compare id.

Therefore, the criminal action was not

terminated by the order dismissing Count I. See id. As such, the State's appeal of the
order dismissing Count I does not fall under the literal language of I.AR. 11 (c)(4), and
so the appeal is not properly brought on that ground either. Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835.
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None of the other provisions in I.A.R. 11 (c) are applicable either. The State is
not appealing a final judgment of conviction or an order granting or denying a withheld
judgment or a plea of guilty.

I.A.R. 11(c)(1)-(2).

Nor is it challenging a judgment

imposing sentence. I.A.R. 11(c)(6). It is not, in regard to the order dismissing Count I,
challenging an order granting a motion to suppress evidence (though that does properly
bring the State's other challenge before this Court). I.A.R. 11 (c)(7). It is not challenging
an order granting or denying a new trial or a decision by the district court sitting in its
appellate capacity. I.AR. 11 (c)(8), (10). Finally, it is not challenging an "order made
after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or state," since no

judgment has been entered in this case. I.A.R. 11(c)(9). Therefore, I.A.R. 11(c) does
not afford the State the right to appeal the order dismissing one count of a multi-count
information. See Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835. As such, the State's appeal challenging
the order dismissing Count I should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Floyd, 137
Idaho at 723; Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835; Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825; Shultz, 151 Idaho
at 385; Rollins, 103 Idaho at 49-50.

C.

According To Idaho Supreme Court Precedent. This Is Not The Type Of Case
Where This Court Should Exercise Its Plenary Authority
While the Idaho Appellate Rules do not permit the State's appeal, the Idaho

Supreme Court has recognized its plenary authority to review any district court ruling,
deriving from the Idaho Constitution:

"The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to

review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts .... The Supreme Court shall
also have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and
habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to complete the exercise of its
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appellate jurisdiction." IDAHO CONST., art. V, § 9. The Supreme Court's interpretation of
that authority provides that the exercise of that authority is appropriate when there are:
important questions concerning the construction of Idaho's Constitution
and its criminal rules and statutes[,] questions which we note are of a
recurring nature and the resolution of which will be of practical importance
in the administration of the criminal justice system which must be resolved
to prevent future criminal proceedings from being improperly dismissed or
reduced by erroneous rulings of the magistrate or district judge.
Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 802 (1977). However, exercise of that power is not

warranted in this case. First, as explained in the respondent's brief, the district court's
decision was not erroneous. (See Resp. Br., pp.27-35.) Therefore, since the exercise
of authority would not be to ensure proceedings are improperly dismissed by erroneous
rulings, the exercise of plenary authority is not warranted. See Stockwell, 98 Idaho at
802.
Additionally, exercise of this authority does not allow the Court to correct an
identified error in this particular case. Rather, it allows the Court to issue an advisory
opinion to influence future cases, since the purpose is to address an issue to "prevent
future criminal proceedings from being improperly dismissed .... " Id. When the Court
has exercised its plenary authority, the opinions have done exactly that, issuing
instruction as to the important issues brought to its attention, but not affording the
remedy requested in the actual pending appeal. See, e.g., State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho
884, 888-89 (1985), Donaldson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and specially
concurring 5 ; State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743 (1975) 6 ; State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759 (1972), 7
superseded by rule as stated in Young, 133 Idaho at 178-79.

In Alanis, Chief Justice Donaldson was a swing vote in the split opinion. As a result,
that opinion holds that an erroneous application of I.C.R. 12(b) was an important issue
5
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The Idaho Supreme Court has already decided that this is not the sort of situation
requiring that sort of guidance. See, e.g., Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835-36; Dennard, 102
Idaho at 825-26. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court has already refused to exercise
this plenary authority on this very question - whether an appeal is properly brought
under I.AR. 11(c). Id. The Idaho Supreme Court explained its rationale in the Dennard
opinion:
We do not believe article V, s 9 was intended by the Framers of our
Constitution to be lightly invoked; there must be some dismissals which
this Court, in the interests of judicial economy, will not hear on appeal.
We believe benefit to judicial administration results when trial judges know
that this Court will not entertain an unappealable order simply because an
appeal is attempted. This instant case falls way short of reaching the
importance of Tinno and Lewis.
Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court

concluded that a decision on the merits of this sort of argument on appeal would "have
little effect on the administration of justice in this state."

Id. at 826.

As such, it

dismissed the State's appeal rather than exercise the plenary authority. Id.

on which the Supreme Court needed to give guidance under the plenary rule, but that
double jeopardy prevented retrial of the defendant. See generally Alanis, 109 Idaho
884. The result is that the plurality's discussion of Rule 12(b) functions as an advisory
opinion. See id.
6 In Lewis, the Idaho Supreme Court decided to exercise its plenary authority so as to
clarify the construction of the criminal statute under which the defendant was
prosecuted. Id. at 747. In particular, the Supreme Court considered whether the district
court properly granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, finding that it
had erroneously weighed the evidence based on its improper understanding of the
statutes at issue. Id. at 747-50. However, that opinion constituted an advisory opinion
since the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevented retrying the
defendant under the proper understanding of the statute. Id. at 750-51.
7 In Tinno, the parties raised "several important issues relating to the effect of the Fort
Bridger Treaty on Indian fishing right claims." Tinno, 94 Idaho at 761-62. However, the
state did not have a right to appeal on the facts presented. Tinno, 94 Idaho at 761.
Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, but issued an advisory opinion under its
plenary authority to resolve those important issues briefed by the parties. See Lewis,
96 Idaho at 746 (explaining the Tinno opinion).
11

The same conclusion, which has been reached in numerous cases, is merited in
this case. See Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835-36 (citing State v. Zarate, 98 Idaho 342, 344
(1977); State v. Daugherty, 98 Idaho 716, 716-17 (1977); State v. Maddock, 97 Idaho
610, 611 (1976); State v. Berlin, 95 Idaho 225, 227 (1973), superseded by rule as
stated in Young, 133 Idaho at 178-79). This is one of those dismissals which in the

interests of judicial economy, will not be heard on appeal. 8 See Dennard, 102 Idaho at
825-26. Therefore, this Court should dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the State's appeal
from the order dismissing Count I. See id.; Molinelli, 105 Idaho at 835-36.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Petersen respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the State's appeal
challenging the order dismissing Count I. Alternatively, he continues to request that this
Court affirm the district court's orders suppressing the evidence and dismissing Count I
for the reasons set forth in the Respondent's Brief.

DATED this 1st day of October, 2 0 ~ # &
BRIAN R. DICKSON

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

If the State really believes it has sufficient evidence, beyond what it presented
originally, to make a case for money laundering, it could decide to refile that charge.
See State v. Ruiz, 106 Idaho 336, 337 (1984). However, based on the record in this
case, as discussed in the Respondent's Brief, the district court correctly concluded that
the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause on that
charge. (See Resp. Br., pp.27-35.) As such, this is not a situation where this Court
should exercise its plenary authority because it does not serve the interests of judicial
efficiency. See Dennard, 102 Idaho at 825-26.
8
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